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INFORMATION-AGE 
POPULISM:
Higher Education as a Civic 
Learning Organization
By Harry C. Boyte
2In 1987, at the urging of Harlan Cleveland, then dean of the new Humphrey Institute of Public
Affairs at the University of Minnesota, we began a project aimed at finding workable remedies for
democracy’s troubles. The challenge was daunting, but resources for such an effort had been accu-
mulating rapidly in the civic experiments of recent decades at the grass roots of society — a civic
ferment largely invisible in academic theory about politics and democracy. 
The most effective civic efforts had piled up a great deal of evidence in support of Jefferson’s
profession of faith in the people as the “only safe repository of the powers of the society.” Though
Americans’ penchant for self-directed action to solve public problems in general seemed to be in
decline, powerful countertrends had also developed. Citizens in communities across the country
were taking up tough problems, from crime and housing to economic development and environ-
mental restoration.  It was clear that an increasing number of challenges required skilled, savvy cit-
izen action if there was to be any hope of resolution.  
It was also clear that the emphasis Jefferson placed on education — especially civic and politi-
cal education — was powerfully vindicated by the most successful low-income, working- and mid-
dle-class citizen groups. Organizations such as those in the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) net-
work founded by the late Saul Alinsky had come to include a wide range of political and religious
viewpoints, racial groups, and income levels. Key to their success was an intense emphasis on devel-
opment of the public skills of leaders, in the context of creating demanding intellectual cultures.  
IAF organizations did not shy away from conflict. But they had become sophisticated in form-
ing what they call “public relationships” with establishment leaders whom many once saw simply as
the enemy. They also stressed moving from “protest to governance,” as described by Gerald Taylor,
IAF’s southern director. “Moving into power means learning how to be accountable,” said Taylor.
“It means being able to negotiate and compromise. It means understanding that people are not nec-
essarily evil because they have different interests or ways of looking at the world.”2
On local and sometimes state levels, the IAF network accumulated remarkable successes.
Citizen organizations such as Communities Organized for Public Service in San Antonio and Valley
Interfaith along the Mexican-American border have reshaped development patterns over the last
generation, bringing hundreds of millions of dollars of infrastructure, economic, and community
development funds into once-impoverished barrios. The BUILD organization in Baltimore pio-
neered large-scale efforts at school reform, which affected low-income students’ graduation rates.
East Brooklyn Churches’ Nehemiah Homes built thousands of affordable, single-family houses in
the midst of an urban area that once looked like a war zone.
Foreword
1Paul Leichester Ford, ed., Thomas Jefferson, The Works of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1903), p. 278.
2The Backyard Revolution: Understanding the New Citizen Movement (Temple, 1980); Community Is Possible: Repairing America’s
Roots (Harper & Row, 1984); Free Spaces: The Sources of Democratic Change in America (Harper & Row, 1986), coauthored with Sara
Evans; and CommonWealth: A Return to Citizen Politics (Free Press, 1989). Interview with Taylor, April 26, 2002.
“I know of no safe repository of the ultimate powers of the 
society but the people themselves; and if we think them not
enlightened enough to exercise control with a wholesome discre-
tion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their
discretion by education.”
—Thomas Jefferson1
3Such political successes, I was convinced, depend not only on individual public leadership
development but on change in cultures of the congregations, which form the base of the IAF 
groups in ways that generate a collective process of civic learning. This requires a shift in the role
of clergy from a mainly pastoral, caring role toward work that is far more energizing and politically
educating. 
These groups highlight the importance of seeing civic engagement as a function of institution-
al cultures, not simply of individual proclivities. From the outset, our approach at the Humphrey
Institute differed from the volume of studies that analyze and diagnose the “crisis of democracy” in
terms of voting levels and civic participation rates. A focus on institutional cultures draws atten-
tion to other questions: “Why are people turned off?” and crucially, “What works to change it?” 
These questions have structured our action research projects at the Center for Democracy and
Citizenship (CDC) over the last 14 years. The center has focused on developing practice-based con-
cepts and civic learning methods that are effective in engaging citizens in public life and invigor-
ating the civic cultures of what we call “mediating institutions,” connecting everyday life to arenas
of governance and policy. 
The Center for Democracy and Citizenship, with a group of close associates, worked in part-
nership with schools, congregations, a settlement house, a nursing home, community educators,
Cooperative Extension, local government, colleges, foundations, the White House Domestic Policy
Council, and Campus Compact (see www.publicwork.org). These initiatives engaged young peo-
ple, parents, rural citizens, school teachers, new immigrant communities and many others. Through
these efforts, we developed the conceptual framework of “public work.” Public work stresses citi-
zenship as productive activity by a mix of people that creates a lasting civic contribution. It is prac-
tical. It solves public problems, produces public things, and develops civic power as part of the
process. It is thus different than civic action as simply deliberation, or citizen politics as a struggle
for justice by the oppressed or disaffected.3
In one sense, public work is a conceptual articulation of the old vernacular tradition of pro-
ductive citizenship, what David Mathews has called the “sweaty and muscular work” of building
schools and creating other public things, which infused American democracy with civic energy in
the nineteenth century. But naming and developing concepts is itself important work. We have
found that self-conscious practice of public work is a way to engage citizens of diverse backgrounds,
and also teach a working respect for those of different backgrounds. As we hear repeatedly from
young people in our networks, “We don’t have to love somebody to do public work with them.”
We have also sought to develop civic pedagogies of public work. As pedagogy, public work
approaches stress a range of skills and habits that include but also go beyond skills of “civics,”
focused on the electoral process, or many versions of “communitarianism,” focused on voluntarism.
Public work skills and habits include communication, strategic and analytical thinking, problem
solving, self-direction, and teamwork. They also entail learning to see the world in broadly “politi-
cal” ways — not as a scramble for scarce resources but as a process of negotiating diverse interests
and views for the sake of broad public benefit. Public work pedagogy, especially developed in the
civic youth initiative called Public Achievement, also involves sustained reflection on political
concepts such as self-interest, power, citizenship, responsibility, public life, and politics.
Developing the concept of the public meanings and dimensions of work also led us to empha-
size the potential of “professions as public work.” Professions as public work is a way to describe
energizing, catalytic professional practices. When they do public work, professionals contribute to
3This argument is first developed in Boyte, “The Pragmatic Ends of Popular Politics,” in Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the
Public Sphere (Boston: MIT, 1992).
public life and the education of citizens as they practice their craft. Professions as public work is a
contrast to expert service delivery.4
Finally, focus on professions and cultures brought our attention to higher education. Higher
education is the formative institution in the construction of professional identities and practices in
our age, as well as in the generation of professional and disciplinary knowledge. This attention coin-
cided with evidence that higher education is an environment ripe for change. A growing discussion
of civic engagement has developed in higher education institutions faced with declining public sup-
port and with increasing demands for relevance. Research supported by the Kellogg and Kettering
Foundations in the late 1990s gave us a way to look at the potential of civic engagement understood
as work, not as off-hours volunteerism. We interviewed dozens of faculty at the University of
Minnesota, as well as administrators, staff, students, and stakeholders in the broader community.
More than expected, the interviews revealed a widespread desire for much more public engagement
as a dimension of regular professional work. Moreover, the interest in public relevance of teaching
and research was not simply an individual desire but was also found in broad, if often invisible, dis-
ciplinary sentiments. “Our whole department feels too cloistered,” said one department chair in the
College of Liberal Arts. “There is a desire to engage more deeply the urban scene and the broader
public world.” 
Over the next two years, building on partnerships with a group of faculty at the College of St.
Catherine, the Center for Democracy and Citizenship worked with Robert Bruininks, Provost, and
Craig Swan, Vice Provost for Undergraduate Education, on strategies for reinvigorating the univer-
sity’s public mission. This resulted in a Task Force on Civic Engagement, appointed in the fall of
2000, charged by the provost with developing comprehensive proposals to “renew the land grant
mission.”
Work with higher education puts back on the table questions that we began with: If democra-
cy depends, in the richest sense, on the “powers of the society” being vested in the broad citizenry
rather than in any elite, what obstacles does higher education present to such empowerment? What
are the opportunities? And what would higher education look like if it became a “civic learning
organization,” a medium for “informing the discretion of the people,” infused with a fresh sense of
public purpose?
4
4For the efforts of Bill Doherty and his colleagues, see www.puttingfamilyfirst.info. For other examples, see “Intellectual
Workbench,” at www.publicwork.org: Nan Kari (occupational therapy); Moriba Karamoko (the IAF work with clergy, organizing);
Julie Ellison (humanities and arts); Nan Skelton (youth development); Deborah Meier (teaching); and Fred Kent (traffic engineer-
ing and urban design).
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Opening up and democratizing the ways in which knowledge is produced, diffused, and adopt-
ed is key to democratic change of every kind in the twenty-first century. It is even key, in a growing
number of cases, to elemental problems of social order and survival. Transformation of higher edu-
cation from a setting whose norms now emphasize detachment and apartness, to a place for civic
engagement, civic learning, and the reconstruction of politics itself, will be at the heart of this
democratization.
This is not to say that expertise is not important, that the search for excellence is not worth-
while, or that norms of judgment, reason, and the capacity to look at questions from many vantages
are not intrinsic to the proper mission of higher education.  We have found that sustained attention
to democratization of knowledge production in higher education illuminates the practical and pub-
lic dimensions of knowledge in the disciplines and professions. Public and practical dimensions of
knowledge add distinctive standards of excellence such as pragmatic tests of practice, and attention
to aspects of learning such as apprenticeship relations. Democratizing knowledge also highlights the
importance of “public spaces,” places for the flourishing of discourse, deliberation, and the making
of broad political and scholarly judgments.5
To undertake democratization of the production and diffusion of knowledge is to stress the need
for disciplines to interact across porous boundaries with the wider world, often in developing of
research agendas, always in discussing the question, “knowledge for what?” 
Democratic publics, full of diverse talents and ways of looking at the world, produce their own
distinctive excellences, as one recalls from the Athenian republic, Italian republics of the
Renaissance, or our own great traditions such as Chautauqua, the Harlem Renaissance, and the
New Deal arts and culture projects. They also create the contexts for using expertise wisely.  As
Mary Follett observed many years ago, science can tell us whether a snake is poisonous or not, but
not what to do about it crawling around on the floor in our midst; that takes collective discussion.
Democratic publics also enlist and cultivate the passions of “amateurs” (from the root, amator, or
5On the public and practical dimensions of knowledge production, and the usefulness of the concept of “craft” in thinking about
these, see “Professions as public crafts,” in the research section of www.publicwork.org; and the interview with Ken Keller in the sec-
tion, “Intellectual Workbench.” On public space, see David Mathews, Creating More Public Space in Higher Education (Washington:
Council on Public Policy Education, 1999).
“A popular government, without popular information or the
means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy,
or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a
people that mean to be their own governors must arm themselves
with the power that knowledge brings.”
—James Madison 
“The essential aim of … the most democratic movements we
have is to train ourselves, to learn how to use the work of
experts, to find our will, to educate our will, to integrate our
wills.…  It is of equal importance with the discovery of facts to
know what to do with them.… In politics we do not keep these
different kinds of information apart.…”
—Mary Parker Follett, Creative Experience, 1924
6Politics as conceived in these terms revolves around the state. And it is seen as a quintessentially distributive activity. David
Easton’s classic definition captures both the state-centered and distributive aspects of politics. Politics, said Easton, is the authoritative
allocation of goods, services, and values. (Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life [New York: John Wiley, 1965]). This is similar to the
classic definition given by Harold Lasswell, who said that politics is the struggle over “who gets what, when, how.” By mid-century, main-
stream American liberals took this to take place within the framework of Federalist Paper #10, which saw politics as the activity of the
political class: “the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pro-
nounced by the people themselves convened for the purpose.” Sidney Hillman, the twentieth-century union leader, added strategic ele-
ments with participatory implications: “Politics is the science of how who gets what, when, and why.” Hillman’s definition has continued
to structure the predominant paradigm of progressive citizen action. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines politics as 1a: The art or
science of government .… 2: Political actions, practices, or policies; 3a: competition between competing interest groups or individuals
for power and leadership in a government or other group. Public work politics adds to this the concept of politics as a productive activi-
ty solving problems and creating public things.
6
lover), a crucial need in a world where experts and governments by themselves can do little to solve
mounting public problems, from global warming to sectarian war.
Knowledge is not a zero-sum resource, such as land or capital, though the ferocious battles over
secrecy in government dramatizes how much is often at stake in the struggle over who knows what
and when.  Knowledge is increased if shared or pooled. Thus, a politics of knowledge differs from
the dominant politics in the twentieth century, which was primarily about distributive struggles over
who gets what.6
A democratic politics of knowledge requires a deep, if unromantic, respect for the talents and
intelligence of ordinary people. Today, devaluation of most people’s talents and intelligence is part
of the warp and woof of institutions of every kind. Thus, democratic politics of knowledge involves
an information-age populist challenge to the meritocracy, which is the structuring ideology of our
age. The reconstruction of higher education in civic populist terms, as a civic learning organization
whose mission is to “inform the discretion” of citizens for self-government, is essential.
Today, most Americans are deeply disaffected by politics. Voting levels have dropped steadily
over the last decade, and there has been a broad decline in many forms of civic participation and
associational life.
A variety of diagnoses are offered to explain civic disengagement: the role of money; the unrav-
eling of public morality and the rise of a culture of radical individualism; even the pervasiveness of
television. But from a civic populist perspective, the elephant in the room is the widespread sense of pow-
erlessness experienced by most Americans. Such powerlessness is produced by the philosophy of meri-
tocracy, which structures our institutions, rendering most people marginal to real decision making
and condescending to their intelligence.  
In 1996, the Kettering Foundation commissioned The Harwood Group, a public issues research
firm, to conduct focus groups across the country in order to better understand the “nature and extent
of the disconnect between what people see as important concerns and their sense that they can
address them.”  The focus groups discovered a nation of citizens deeply troubled about the direction
of the society as a whole, even if they felt optimistic about their own personal lives and economic
prospects after several years of economic expansion. They saw large institutions, from government
to business to education, as increasingly remote and focused on narrow gain. They worried that
America is becoming a “greedy nation,” where values such as “looking out for number one” and “get-
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7ting rich quick” replaced hard work, accountability, community and family life, and a sense of the
human and the sacred. They expressed grave concerns that people were increasingly divided by race,
ideology, religion, and class.  Society used to “build walls to put the bad people in,” said one man in
Memphis. “Now we’re building walls to keep the bad people out.” He also saw that as futile. “There’s
no sense of community anymore. Everybody is walled off from the other neighborhood.”
Citizens feel powerless to do much about these trends. As a result, they retreat into smaller and
smaller circles of private life where they do have some control, even if they think retreat spells trou-
ble. “If you look at the whole picture of everything that is wrong, it is so overwhelming,” said one
woman from Richmond, voicing widely held sentiments. “You just retreat back and take care of
what you know you can take care of — and you make it smaller, make it even down to just you and
your unit. You know you can take care of that.”7
In 1999, a parallel study of baby boomers and older adults by the Minnesota Board of Aging in
Minnesota found similar results. Using a public-work model of citizen engagement that asked about
interest in “doing more than simply volunteer” by participating in  solving public and community
problems, the board organized a series of focus groups. They found that both baby boomers and 
older adults have a strong desire to feel useful, to make serious contributions to rebuilding a sense
of community, and to be involved in decision making about the shape of their communities.
Citizens also expressed the desire to learn civic skills such as how to work across divisions of ideol-
ogy, race, or culture, and learning “big-picture thinking” that ties specific tasks to the larger ques-
tions and challenges.  
Finally, citizens felt that most volunteer opportunities relegate them to “positions of mediocrity
with the assumption that they lack the capacity to work on big issues that affect the community.”
Volunteers, in their view, are rarely asked “what they are good at, what is important to them, and
how they want to be part of shaping their communities.” 8
Such patterns of institutional condescension derive from meritocracy, which has spread
throughout our society like a silent civic disease, disempowering and marginalizing people.  
John Lukacs, a self-described “reactionary Catholic intellectual,” and a refugee from Hungary in
1957, observed this dynamic in his 1984 book, Outgrowing Democracy. Lukacs argued that the 1950s
was the pivotal decade.  He had come to America, he said, believing that the country overestimat-
ed the capacities of “the democratic masses.” But whether that was ever true, the 1950s saw a sea
change. America shifted from a “democratic order” to a “bureaucratic state” dominated by a cult of
efficiency. Government was by no means alone; virtually every institution — the media, schools,
higher education, foundations, businesses — came to radically underestimate people’s capacities.9
Politics today dramatizes meritocracy, a philosophy of rule by “the best and the brightest.” Joan
Didion details this pattern in her new book, Political Fictions, based on her essays in The New York
Review of Books on American political campaigns from 1988 to 2000.  
Among most Democratic candidates and their staffs, she found a palpable assumption of supe-
riority. “I recall pink-cheeked young aides on the Dukakis campaign referring to themselves, 
innocent of irony and so of history, as ‘the best and the brightest,’” she writes. 
Conservative pundits and politicians are at least as arrogant. 
7Richard C. Harwood, “The Nation’s Looking Glass,” Kettering Review, Spring 2000, pp. 15-16; 7-8.
8Dean Mohs, Celebrating and Encouraging Community Involvement of Older Minnesotans: A Snapshot of Current Minnesota Baby
Boomers and Older Adults, Minnesota Board of Aging, April, 2000, pp. 6, 3.
9Lukacs (New York: University Press, 1984). For a detailed treatment of the spread of managerial cultures — the “cult of 
efficiency” — see also Robert Kanigel, One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Cult of Efficiency.
 
8“Given their obstinate lack of interest in the subject, asking a group of average Americans about
politics is like asking a group of stevedores to solve a problem in astrophysics,” wrote Andrew
Ferguson, a senior editor of The Weekly Standard in 1996. “Before long they’re explaining not mere-
ly that the moon is made of cheese, but what kind of cheese it is…” The impeachment controver-
sy of the late 1990s, according to Didion, illustrated how omnipresent the political establishment’s
sense of superiority and detachment from most Americans had become.
A 1998 New York Times editorial by Senator Alan Simpson argued that Republicans’ failure to
win impeachment would have little consequence, since “the attention span of Americans is ‘Which
movie is coming out next month?’”  Mainstream commentators, giving no notice to Simpson’s stun-
ning disdain for the public, illustrated a wider pattern. “What remains novel, and unexplained, was
the increasingly histrionic insistence of the political establishment that it stood apart from, and
indeed above, the country that had until recently been considered its validation. Under the lights
at CNN and MSNBC and the Sunday shows, it became routine to declare oneself remote from
‘them,’ or ‘out there.’”10
Political attitudes among the establishment largely derive from the culture of higher education.
The unconscious assumption of meritocracy even among leaders in higher education who call for
reengagement with society is striking. Thus, in a 1989 lecture, Donna Shalala, then Chancellor of
the University of Wisconsin, made an impassioned plea for public service and social justice, for
struggles against racism and sexism, for environmentalism and peace. She called for public univer-
sities to engage the world. And she wed these calls explicitly to meritocracy. For her, “the ideal [is]
a disinterested technocratic elite” fired by the moral mission of “society’s best and brightest in serv-
ice to its most needy.” The imperative is “delivering the miracles of social science” to fix society’s
social problems “just as doctors cured juvenile rickets in the past.”11
These sentiments are the rule, not the exception, in elite research universities. Meritocratic
assumptions are woven into the everyday fabric of life. “Access versus excellence” was the way
Minnesota Public Radio framed its statewide discussion in 2001 on the future of the University of
Minnesota. It took as self-evident the idea that large numbers of students of diverse backgrounds
inherently meant a decline in “standards of excellence.”
Conventional research protocols and methods make much the same assumption. For instance,
as Davydd Greenwood, an anthropologist at Cornell, and his colleague, Morten Levin have point-
ed out in An Introduction to Action Research, the ideal of expert-driven scholarship structures most
social science research, which assumes that research agendas are best developed by detached
researchers outside public settings and puts a premium on mathematical and quantitative approach-
es, predictive theories, and abstract formulations. 
A hidden meritocratic approach shapes contemporary patterns of professional education, cre-
dentialing, and continuing education as theorists and historians of professionalism such as Donald
Schon and Ellen Lagemann have demonstrated.12
The notion that only “experts” are in a position to judge first-rate scholarship is at work in 
purportedly blind peer review of academic journal articles. Meritocracy also visibly shapes the stance
of sharp critics of professional systems such as post-modernists and deconstructionists. 
Their inaccessible language — as if defying the uninitiated to understand them — is a measure of
distance from ordinary people. 
10Joan Didion, Political Fictions (New York: Knopf), pp. 28, 279, 253-4.
11Shalala, David Dodds Henry Lecture at University of Illinois, 1989.
12Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Donald Schon, The Reflective
Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
 
9In the twentieth century, an eclectic mix of conservative and progressive populists, from Robert
Nisbet, Peter and Bridgette Berger, and William Schambra to Zora Neal Hurston, Simone Weil,
Sheldon Wolin, Christopher Lasch, and James Scott, challenged the claims of overweening expert
authority and positivist knowledge at the heart of meritocracy. They drew attention to the realm of
the everyday, the vernacular, and the commonplace, to practical knowledge, and to rooted identi-
ties such as ties to place, family, religion, and ethnicity.  They argued that the modernist imagina-
tion, reflected in progressive, liberal, and left wing politics ever since the Enlightenment, had treat-
ed everyday lives and cultures of ordinary citizens with disdain and condescension at best, hostility
at worst.  In the 1970s, this criticism was expressed in a challenge to the “geometric thinking” of
the modernist mind, whose prejudices against religious groups, neighborhoods, families, and other
human-scale institutions are embodied in many social and public policies.13
In the populist critique, the modernist imagination has been fed especially, if not solely, by a
positivist philosophical rendering of science and technology.  In positivism, models of knowledge
supposedly based on scientific epistemology emphasize the detached, rational, analytic observer as
the highest judge of truth and the most effective problem solver.  This approach is in conflict with
communal common sense, folk traditions, and appreciation for practical knowledge mediated
through everyday life experience. 
This is not to counterpose a wrongheaded science with a virtuous folk wisdom. Anne Fadiman
makes the point in her book, The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down:
Once several years ago, when I romanticized the Hmong more (though admired
them less) than I do now, I had a conversation with a Minnesota epidemiologist at
a health care conference. Knowing he had worked with the Hmong, I started to
lament the insensitivity of Western medicine. The epidemiologist looked at me
sharply. “Western medicine saves lives,”  she said. Oh. Right. I had to keep remind-
ing myself of that. It was all that cold, linear, Cartesian, non-Hmonglike thinking,
which saved my father from colon cancer....14
In politics, as in medicine, the key point is that there are different sorts of valuable knowledge,
and it is the productive interaction of such a mix of knowledge and talent that has the potential to
be profoundly educative and creative. A celebration of the scientifically educated expert as the sin-
gular actor in public affairs marginalizes the amateur and the vantage, talents, and knowledge she
or he brings.15
It greatly impoverishes the knowledge-creation process as well. What are the dynamics of
power and citizen politics in the “Information Age”? A closer examination reveals obstacles and
suggests possibilities.
13Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy (Washington: AEI,
1977); see also my own treatment of this from a populist perspective in The Backyard Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple, 1980).
14Anne Fadiman, The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down: A Hmong Child, Her American Doctors, and the Collision of Two Cultures
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1997), p. 276.
15For a discussion of the reliance of even ardent early 20th-century participatory democrats on positivist epistemology, see William
Sullivan, Reconstructing Public Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California, 1985). For a stunning treatment of the devaluation of expe-
riential knowledge around the world by governments operating out of “high modernist” ideology, see James Scott, Seeing Like a State:
How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. See also Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy
of Pragmatism (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1989). For treatments of the implicit condescension of experts toward amateurs and
traditional communities in liberal as well as socialist ideologies, see Harry Boyte, “Populism and the Left,” Democracy, No. 2 (1981); and
Boyte and Kari, Building America, especially chapter five, “The New Nobility.” 
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Without romanticizing the American past or glossing over its injustices, a considerable body of
scholarship has illuminated the importance of work-centered understandings of democracy.
Throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, democratic citizenship in America
and our sense of politics were tied to what might be called a civic and populist view: democracy was
a work in progress, something the people made. And work-centered democracy was accompanied
by a robust culture of civic learning. To help make the world, people had to know about it.
Home libraries and reading groups, settlement houses and “schools as social centers,” commu-
nity colleges and the great tradition of land grant and public universities, the Harlem Renaissance
and the New Deal public arts and culture programs were all infused with this spirit of productive
public work, democratic learning, and knowledge-creation. James Weldon Johnson captured the
ethos in Black Manhattan:
Harlem is more than a community.… It is a large-scale laboratory experiment.
Through his artistic efforts the Negro is smashing immemorial stereotypes.… He is
impressing upon the national mind the conviction that he is an active and important
force in American life; that he is a creator as well as a creature; that he has given as
well as received; that his gifts have been not only obvious and material, but also spir-
itual and aesthetic; that he is a contributor to the nation’s common cultural store; in
fine, he is helping to form American civilization.16
In these terms, citizenship was understood not as the high-minded, virtuous, and leisure-time
activity of gentlemen. Rather, it was the down-to-earth labors of ordinary people who created
goods, who undertook projects of public benefit, who learned things in the process, and who showed
the nation what they could do as creative agents. Citizenship was public work. 
Citizenship as public work lent dynamism, spirit, and an everyday “political-ness” to American
democracy. It accorded honor and authority to those who were “builders of the commonwealth,”
whatever their birth or educational status. The authority gained through work with civic overtones
meant that relatively powerless groups had multiple potential resources for gaining power. The peo-
ple not only made the commonwealth. They were the commonwealth. And they had high regard
for the common wealths they helped to make — schools and libraries, parks and bridges, local art
fairs, and civic holidays. 
Americans radiated boldness in action and pride in work that amazed foreign observers.  The
civic aspects of many different kinds of work turned America into a seedbed for insurgent move-
ments, utopian experiments, and popular politics of every kind. Even those excluded from the com-
monwealth, such as slaves, women, and the poor, found in its themes potent resources for demo-
cratic action. 
Citizenship understood as public work largely disappeared in the 1950s and 1960s as Americans
were slowly transformed from “producers” into “consumers,” and the intelligence and talents of
most people became devalued. Today, much of civic activism has a far different character than it
once did, taking the form of aggrieved outsiders asking the government to do things for them.
Meanwhile, accounts of citizenship as volunteerism obliterate questions of power and politics alto-
gether.  
For all the obstacles, it has been the premise of our work at the Center for Democracy and
Citizenship that the new information society with its changing power dynamics and patterns of
16See, for instance, Gordon Wood, Radicalism of the American Revolution and Robert Wiebe, Self-Rule: A Cultural History of
Democracy, and Harry Boyte and Nan Kari, Building America. Johnson quoted from Harold Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual (New
York: Quill, 1984), p. 34.
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work holds potential for reviving a populist politics of public work and a commonwealth that is our 
common creation. 
Effective citizen action in our times is possible if — and only if — citizens develop the abilities
to gain access to information of all kinds and the skills to put such information to use. Possibilities
for a popular sovereignty are dependent not only on information and knowledge but also on what
might best be called  “wisdom,” the ability to frame and guide action with integrative concepts and
a clear set of public values and purposes. Without a sense of “why” the action is undertaken,
activism leads inexorably toward “activity,” a scattered and often frenetic busyness.
The characterization of our country as an information society grows particularly from the work
of theorists like Raymond Aron and Daniel Bell. Bell and others draw attention to the increasing
role of knowledge-creation as a source of power in its own right. Richard Florida has recently argued
that knowledge workers, or what he calls “the creative class,” account for 30 percent of the work-
force, and locations where such workers and their occupations are most concentrated are the main
centers of economic growth.
Energy generated by steam and electricity transformed preindustrial societies into industrial
societies.  Money replaced raw materials as the main strategic resource. Today, data-transmission sys-
tems and the theoretical knowledge required to organize information are the driving forces of inno-
vation, strategic resources and power, shaping a world economy and changing the pattern of human
relationships. “The industrial era was characterized by the influence of humankind over things,
including Nature as well as the artifacts of Man,” wrote Harlan Cleveland, an astute analyst of
knowledge as a resource.  “The information era features a sudden increase in humanity’s power to
think, and therefore to organize.” Such a process, in turn, puts those who do the conceptual organ-
izing in a particularly powerful position. Bell assumed meritocracy, seeing a “knowledge elite” of sci-
entists, mathematicians, economists, engineers, and professionals of all sorts progressively replacing
the traditional governing groups of managers, capitalists, and business executives.17
One does not have to subscribe to the most extravagant arguments that we are entering a qual-
itatively new world, or that the forms of organization, social and class structure associated with cap-
italist society are rapidly dissolving, to note the profound changes in patterns of power and politics
that the growing centrality of knowledge and its use are bringing about.  In many ways, the current
knowledge revolution represents an acceleration of trends that have increasingly shaped our world
throughout the twentieth century. 
We are at the end of a long period of time — what might be called “the meritocratic era,” or
the age of welfare state politics — in which citizenship has been defined in weak and attenuated
ways in significant part because of the centralization of knowledge, reflected in and significantly pro-
duced by institutions of higher education. In the twentieth century, Americans handed over to
experts, technicians, and professionals the power to make the key decisions about our common-
wealth — the basic public goods, or what is sometimes called the social and economic infrastruc-
ture, that were widely seen as essential to the society.  
Today, knowledge itself has become more and more central to patterns of domination, on the
one hand, and democratic action, on the other. Power is gathered not only in distant corporate
17Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Kenneth
Boulding, Meaning of the Twentieth Century: The Great Transition (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); Richard Florida, The Rise of the
Creative Class: How It’s Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life (New York: BasicBooks, 2002); Harlan Cleveland, The
Knowledge Executive (New York: Dutton, 1985), p. 20. For critical perspectives, see Peter N. Stearns, “Is There a Post-Industrial Society?”
reprinted in Leigh Estabrook, Libraries in Post-Industrial Society (Phoenix: Oryx, 1977), pp. 8-18; and Michael Harrington, “Post-
Industrial Society and the Welfare State,” Ibid., pp. 18-29.
18For the “clientization” of the citizenry, see for instance, Barton Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the
Development of Higher Education in America (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976); Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: The Family
Besieged (New York: Basic Books, 1977); and Joseph Tussman, “Obligation and the Body Politic,” Henry Kariel, Frontiers of Democratic
Theory (New York: Random, 1970), pp. 18-21.  
19For instance, Joan C. Durrance in her book, Armed for Action: Library Response to Citizen Information Needs (New York: Neal
Schuman, 1984), studied a cross-section of citizen activists and found almost all successful leaders were sophisticated consumers and users
of information, skilled in knowing where to find out what they needed to know.
20Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting (New York: Penguin, 1981); Zuboff quoted in Garry Emmons’ interview with
Zuboff, “Smart Machines and Learning People,” Harvard Magazine, November-December, 1988, p. 60; see also Shoshana Zuboff, In the
Age of the Smart Machine (New York: Basic Books, 1988).
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boardrooms; it is as close as the doctor’s office, the social service agency waiting room, or the child-
rearing advice manual.  In our educated, service society, most middle-class and professional people
can be both  the power elite and the powerless, depending on the system or institution.18
In the twentieth century, control over information-generating processes and control over infor-
mation have resided in large-scale institutions such as governments and corporations, which have
the resources and personnel necessary for accumulating, processing, and storing specialized knowl-
edge.  Such centralization has been justified on the grounds that large-scale problem solving is sim-
ply too difficult for ordinary citizens: the highly trained specialist — the expert — has been touted
as the appropriate handler of information. 
As knowledge becomes increasingly a source of power, the struggle around its accessibility and
use becomes more and more central to democracy.  The success of contemporary citizen politics in
a variety of contexts depends on the ability to discover key information, often against the efforts of
powerful interests to restrict information access.  From the housewife who worries about local
school dropout rates to the rancher fighting to preserve the open range from energy conglomerates,
from community activists organizing around toxic waste to owners of small businesses trying to
increase the pool of resources available in their areas for entrepeneurial start-up projects, people
need information to act. They also need the organizational and communicative skills to organize.
Studies of grassroots leaders have found that the most successful have developed considerable tal-
ents at gaining access to information, and the organizing skills that facilitate action.19
There is a further, broad problem with the structure and pattern of knowledge in our society
that is harder for citizen activists to overcome. Large-scale organizations and centralized bureau-
cracies not only centralize information; they also fragment it and strip it of meaning in ways that
mirror the excessive specialization we learn in academic life and the professions. Data about hous-
ing, for instance, is rarely related to crime statistics, or health care patterns,  demographic informa-
tion, or environmental problems. Issues are separated from the larger context in which they appear.
We have lost the longitudinal knowledge needed to see questions in perspective.   
Narrow specialization breeds a historical forgetfulness that has disastrous consequences for
democracy. A character in the novel, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, by Milan Kundera, rages
against the obliteration of history in communist nations: “The struggle of man against power is the
struggle of memory against forgetting.”  Shoshana Zuboff, one of the most perceptive observers of
the information revolution, echoed such sentiments in a different context. Without an active,
informed, thoughtful citizenry, she told Harvard Magazine, new technologies create a “social amne-
sia” that obliterates any strong value perspective. “As the sense of how things were fades from
awareness, we may be oblivious to what we’re losing in the quality of our world.” Zuboff maintained
that education’s role is more crucial than ever: “to remind students of the classical themes in human
experience, create a sense of kinship between present and past, and heighten understandings of the
continuities in the human condition. What we’re talking about is preserving our humanity and our
human values in a world whose forces and pressures and seductions tell us to believe in technology
and technological solutions.”20
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Knowledge needs to be guided by wisdom — broader frameworks, concepts, and values that inte-
grate information and the knowledge of how to use it, that contextualize, prioritize, and guide action.
But it  goes against the grain of the times to think in broad and integrative ways about civic prac-
tice. Much citizen activism in recent years, on both local and national levels, has addressed itself to
fairly narrow issues. Activists do not often ask what their work “means” in a larger sense, where they
are going in the long run, or how their particular efforts might add up to more than the particular or
localized campaigns they engage in. Citizen activism has frequently gained voice for marginal, poor,
or minority communities historically left out of most decision making. It has done so, in large part,
by generating effective ways of getting information citizens need, and teaching the skills to organize
significant numbers of people. But like conventional politics, much grassroots activism has spoken a
thin, sometimes cynical, language of narrow interests and protest detached from any enlarged social
and political vision. Such activity neglects the way in which citizen politics ultimately depends on
political arts and capacities such as the skillful use of power, imagination, judgment, and learning
from experience, that are only developed through self-conscious cultivation. And while such
activism may succeed in important issue fights or local struggles, it does not do much to change the
wider pattern of power relations nor the political culture.  
In themselves, technology, science, and the knowledge and political modes of thought they gen-
erate, are detached from human ends and values.  In a technological world, Kundera’s dictum can be
reordered: the struggle to remember, and to build the communal frameworks through which to
remember, constitute central ingredients of the struggle for power. Lasting, large-scale citizen efforts
that begin to revitalize a strong sense of public life renew communal traditions and value frameworks.
If an information society has dangers, it also offers opportunities. While large institutions try
mightily to keep secrets, they find it harder and harder to do so. One of the distinctive features of
the “knowledge revolution” today is that information is more difficult to hoard (community-organ-
izing lore abounds with stories of the “inside sympathizer” who leaked information at critical
moments of a community struggle against a bank, a developer, or a chemical company). Information
is not used up if it is given out.  In many cases, it increases in value.  Efforts to hoard information,
in fact, lead to inertia and stagnation — a lesson learned by Soviet Bloc officials, by tobacco com-
pany executives, and by intelligence officials after 9/11. Information lends itself to sharing transac-
tions, rather than the exchange transactions of the marketplace. And if it is unusual to think about
the values and concepts that frame and guide activity in our age of excessive specialization, skillful
efforts to do so produce considerable power in their own right.  Anne Fadiman’s book about a disas-
trous encounter between American medical practice and Hmong culture contains striking examples
of alternative democratic practice that increased the power and effectiveness of professionals who
showed respect and paid attention. Doctors like Dwight Conquergood were successful in introduc-
ing public health practices in Thai refugee camps by drawing on Hmong cultural symbols and by
showing connections between Western medicine and traditional practices.
Information without public discussion of its meaning is, in itself, a barren form of communica-
tion. Citizen initiatives or professional practices that recognize and seek to remedy this void, espe-
cially when carried out in collaborative ways that create a broad sense of ownership, speak to the
immense hunger that has developed in our society for reintegrating the human element into large
systems and technological modes of thought. And, as Carmen Sirianni and Lew Friedland demon-
strate at length in writing about health policy efforts like Oregon Health Decisions, widespread civic
involvement in the formulation of public policies can also generate civic authority that expert-led
processes never generate.21
21One of the frustrations during the New Citizenship effort I coordinated in association with the White House Domestic Policy
Council was that we could  not convince the administration to pay attention to such lessons during the health care debate. For a descrip-
tion built on this experience, see Carmen Sirianni and Lew Friedland, Civic Innovation in America (Berkeley: University of California,
2001). Their book is a powerful examination of the power of “civic learning” in several domains, including  community organizing and
environmentalism. 
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22Or as the Star Tribune put it, in calling for “a statewide conversation about the university’s needs and its role in the state” as part
of the search for a new president, “The university [is] the single most important shaper of Minnesota’s future.” June 1, 2002.
Citizen groups and initiatives that engage in such work revive the conception of politics as the
activity of equal citizens engaged in argument, debate, dialogue, conflict, and common work.  They
provide a political education adapted to a modern, complex, and technological society, through
which individual citizens and smaller communities come to understand the interconnections of
their lives with others who are different from themselves. 
Higher education is the premier “information” institution of modern society. It socializes pro-
fessionals. It creates credentialed knowledge. It generates and diffuses the conceptual frameworks
that structure practices and institutional cultures of all sorts, from global finance to parent educa-
tion. It educates students for occupations. If higher education becomes infused with what Harvard
President Charles Eliot called, long ago, “the democratic spirit,” it will become the seedbed for a
new politics, with dramatic effects. 
The latent democratic and political power of higher education is widely understood. Indeed, it
was a regular topic of conversation in the public forums with diverse constituencies that were part
of the provost’s Civic Engagement Task Force at the University of Minnesota over the last two
years. As one forum participant put it, “The whole future of the state of Minnesota is bound up with
the university. If the university recovers its public purposes, it will have an impact everywhere.”22
In higher education, renewed attention to questions of civic learning and civic engagement is
driven not simply by broad visions of democracy but also by gritty questions of self-interest and even
survival. Especially for public universities, the trends of decreasing support in state legislatures,
mixed with increasing use of market criteria and language such as the redefinition of students as
“customers” and competition from on-line for-profit colleges or business colleges, make strategies for
change of enormous importance.
Increasing public engagement in higher education will involve, necessarily, broad alliances
across different political traditions, views, and approaches. Populists need to work with proponents
of the “best and the brightest” — a politics which, in different variants, is now dominant in research
universities. If this view lacks respect for the intelligence of ordinary citizens, its partisans are also
deeply concerned about withdrawal of public support from public institutions. Out of their concern
for justice, they are also often allies on crucial issues such as the importance of multiracial and mul-
ticultural campus cultures, or the importance of access for lower-income students.
Information-age populists also need to make alliances with conservative advocates of a service
ethic in higher education. However much the rhetoric of “service,” “volunteering,” and “helping
the needy” can create patterns of dependency and self-righteous solicitude, advocates of service do,
nonetheless, seek to change the cultures of disengagement and ivory-tower detachment that settled
in as the norm in the 1950s. Many conservatives who may fear “the power of the people” nonethe-
less can be enlisted in efforts to engage higher education with communities.
If higher education is to become a vital force that genuinely “informs the discretion” of the peo-
ple for democratic self-governance, we need to develop a richer and more extensive populist poli-
Higher
Education as a
Civic Learning
Organization
23Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment (New York: Oxford, 1978); Boyte and Riessman’s edited collection, The New 
Populism with Sheldon Wolin, Elizabeth Minnich, Robert Bellah, Ernesto Cortes, Manning Marable, Cornell West, Gianna Pomata,
and others (Philadelphia: Temple, 1986); and Boyte, CommonWealth: A Return to Citizen Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989);
Christopher Lasch, Revolt of the Elites; Lary May, The Big Tomorrow: Hollywood and the Politics of the American Way (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 2000); Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion (New York: Basic Books, 1995); David Levering Lewis, “Martin
Luther King and the Promise of Nonviolent Populism,” Journal of African Civilization 9 (1987); and scholars on Black Populism,
http://kalamumagazine.com/black_populism_intro.htm.  
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tics for the information age. In part, this means retrieving a largely unknown but vibrant populist
heritage that runs as a subterranean thread throughout the twentieth century.23
It also means articulating key features of  a model civic learning organization. 
If higher education is to become a civic learning organization it will mean giving conscious
attention to the public and productive qualities of the creation and diffusion of knowledge.  Putting
the “public” back into public universities means multiplying public spaces, where people with
diverse views can wrestle with controversial issues. As Edwin Fogelman, chair of the University of
Minnesota’s Civic Engagement Task Force, and Victor Bloomfield, vice provost for research, have
observed, recognizing and naming the public impact and purposes of every kind of scholarship hold
wide implications for change in the university culture. In immediate, strategic terms, one task is to
begin integrating questions about public impact into activities reports and criteria for promotion
and tenure. 
Developing public dimensions of university research requires support structures for reciprocal,
long-term partnerships with diverse publics and higher education. It means re-thinking the “tripart
mission” of research, teaching, and outreach as more like a stack than a “three-legged stool.” It
means keeping knowledge creation public, open, and accessible — resisting trends toward the pri-
vatization and patenting of knowledge. Five other features of a Civic Learning Organization are also
critical: 
1) Power-building: The civic learning organization is committed to the empowerment of
citizens and communities. Surveys of civic engagement efforts at the University of
Minnesota have turned up numerous examples of partnerships that empower communities
and citizens. The Jane Addams School for Democracy, a learning and public work partnership
with new immigrants in the West Side neighborhood of St. Paul, for example, has helped
forge productive relationships with the regional Immigration and Naturalization Service, suc-
cessfully pressed for congressional recognition of Hmong veterans, and undertaken educa-
tional reform efforts of many kinds. Public Achievement, an international civic engagement
effort for young people, has proven highly successful in teaching skills and concepts of every-
day empowerment. The College of Architecture and Landscape Architecture has sought to
revive the land grant partnership approach, working with communities to strengthen their
power to shape the quality of their built environments. In one instance, the college helps sub-
urban communities resist the sales pitches of giant civil engineering firms, that seek to sell
sewer systems that are so expensive it takes urban sprawl to pay for them.  
2) Pedagogical: The civic learning organization is educative and attentive to civic pedago-
gies. Here, there is much to build on in the movements for experiential learning, service-
learning, and learning organizations. Learning theorists have mounted sustained criticisms
against most educational environments, which they see as static, fragmented, and one-direc-
tional. Margaret Mead called such static environments “the vertical cultural transmission
model”; Dewey called them “the cold-storage ideal of knowledge”; the Brazilian educator
Paulo Freire said they used “the banking theory of education.”
An explosion of interactive, engaging practices and pedagogies have sought to challenge and
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change “the cold storage ideal.” In higher education, for instance, Campus Compact
reports that now more than 12,000 courses emphasize active, community-based, and service-
learning. 
Civic learning adds a sustained attention to the “so what?” of learning, both for individuals
and organizations. It stresses learning, like knowledge production, as “work,” with the larger
aims of solving public problems and building democratic society. It integrates self-conscious
attention to political and civic concepts, such as politics, power, and citizenship. We have
seen repeatedly the power of such explicit civic and political language among young people
and students of every age.
3) People-oriented: The civic learning organization is relational. It builds public relation-
ships that cross the rigid boundaries that characterize higher education today. It must recog-
nize the complex humanity of people involved in higher education, resisting the reduction-
ism that comes from seeing individuals through the narrow prisms of a particular discipline
or theory. 
Such recognition is both an ethos of the civic learning culture and a means of change. One
of the key distinctions in the world of organizing over the last generation is between “mobi-
lizing” (getting people out for some project or protest), and “organizing” (involving deep cul-
ture change).24 Organizing involves retrieval of the histories of a particular place or institu-
tion, making explicit networks and “relational leaders” who may not be visible but who bear
the culture and traditions of a community. Finally, organizing means recognition that we
need to develop sustained alliances with those seeking to reinvigorate civic dimensions of
disciplines, as well as with other higher education institutions, especially those undertaking
systemwide change. Developing public relationships takes longer, but it is the crucial foun-
dation for deep change. 
4) Place-based: The civic learning organization is contextual. It thinks deeply in terms of
“place,” and the identities, rhythms, histories, and cultures that surround a place. It also
thinks about the campus itself as a place that is both a text for learning and a context for
research. Thinking contextually also means thinking about the larger public environment
and policy context in which we seek change. A key lesson in the work at the University of
Minnesota over the past two years has been the need to pay attention to the implications of
policy debates in the state legislature. We also have learned to see the civic engagement effort
at the university as tied to civic efforts in other parts of the state ranging from reform efforts
in K-12 schools to reform in health care. 
5) Prophetic: Finally, the civic learning organization is visionary. This means understand-
ing and claiming the distinctive missions of public involvement that animated colleges or
universities in the past. It also means an important role for higher education in developing a
different kind of politics to deal with the elusive but often overwhelming power of the enter-
tainment and communications industries to define reality.
There is deep discontent about values and purposes in America today, reaching to the cen-
ter of suburbia. William Doherty, a professor of family social science at the University of
Minnesota, works with middle-class families in a group called Putting Family First. Its aim is
24For a discussion of the difference between “organizing” and “mobilizing” in the American civil rights movement, see Charles M.
Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Struggle (Berkeley: University of California, 1995).
to “take back our kids” from a commercial and competitive culture spinning out of control.
Doherty and his colleagues are seeking to reconceptualize the disciplines of psychotherapy
and family education in more public terms, as “catalytic partnerships” in which families and
ordinary people are the central actors.25
The Imagining America coalition of colleges and universities, based at the University of
Michigan, is dedicated to bringing academic humanists back into public life through sus-
tained, reciprocal partnerships. Imagining America, according to Julie Ellison, its director, “is
a strategic advocate and citizens’ lobby for artists and humanists aiming to build a national
movement in support of ambitious public scholarship.” It also “offers an example for other
disciplines to emulate as they reclaim their public soul and public muscle.”
We need a lot of public soul and public muscle in America today. We also need a different kind
of politics that is public and productive, empowering, relational, contextual, educative, and expan-
sive in vision. Insofar as institutions of higher education become civic learning organizations, they
can be key players in effecting this transformation. 
25(see www.puttingfamilyfirst.info)

